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COMMENT
MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF "ORDERS
NOT TO RESUSCITATE"
Recent medical and technological advances have enabled physicians to
artificially extend a patient's respiratory and cardiac capacities beyond the
natural course of a terminal illness. As a result, physicians are often the
ultimate judges concerning the time and manner of a patient's death. Even
when the patient's family assumes this immense responsibility, they must
rely almost exclusively upon the physician's recommendations due to his
superior technical expertise. How a physician arrives at the decision to al-
low death to occur without medical intervention and whether or not there
should be other parties involved in this decision are questions which pose a
dilemma for the legal, as well as the medical, profession.'
The medical community's solution for decreasing the suffering of termi-
nally ill patients is the issuance of "orders not to resuscitate" (ONTR).
ONTR are:"orders issued in anticipation of inevitable death, instructing the
hospital staff that in the event of cardiac or respiratory failure, aggressive
medical care is to be withheld.2 An analysis of several recent New Jersey,
1. See generally Collins, Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging L!fe, 206 J.
A.M.A. 389 (1968); Corbett & Raciti, Withholding Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment From
the Institutionalized Person-Who Decides?, 46 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON LAW 47 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Withholding Medical Treatment]; Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not
to Resuscitate, 295 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 364 (1976); Scott, Lfe Support. Who Decides?And
How?, 7 LEGAL Asp. OF MED. PRAC. 33 (1979); Comment, The Problem of Prolonged Death.
Who Should Decide?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 169 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Problem of Pro-
longed Death]; Note, No-Code Orders vs. Resuscitation.- The Decision to Withhold Lfe-Pro-
.longing Treatment from the Terminally 111, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 139 (1979).
2. As early as 1973, the National Conference on Standards for Cardiopulmonary Re-
suscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC) recognized the necessity of establish-
ing a procedure by which physicians could indicate that additional medical treatment was
not advantageous to the patient. The Conference suggested that "orders not to resuscitate"
be indicated in the patient's progress notes and communicated to the rest of the hospital
staff. See Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care
(ECC), 227 J. A.M.A. 837 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Standards for CPR and ECC.
ONTR are distinquished from other forms of medical care which terminate pre-existing
patient support systems, such as the discontinuance of respirators. ONTR include instruc-
tions not to use inotropic or vasopressor drugs, which increase cardiac contractility and
maintain blood pressure, respectively, or not to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR), which is the restoration of life and consciousness by means of artificial respiration or
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Massachusetts, and New York court decisions3 reveals that because the
physician is the party most capable of deciding whether aggressive medical
treatment is in the best interests of the patient, ONTR should be issued at
the sole discretion of the physician. Court involvement should occur only
when there is a conflict between what the incompetent's family and physi-
cians believe the patient's best interests to be.
It should first be noted that there is little professional opposition to the
rationale underlying the use of ONTR.4 Most medical and ethical authori-
ties would agree that there is a point at which further medical treatment
contravenes the best interests of a terminally ill patient, making ONTR
necessary.' The problems with ONTR concern the definition of terms phy-
cardiac massage. For a more detailed explanation of these terms, see B. MILLER & C.
KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND NURSING (1972) and A.
LEWIS, MODERN DRUG ENCYCLOPEDIA AND THERAPEUTIC INDEX (1979).
Many hospitals refer to ONTR as "no codes" due to the absence of emergency care that is
required when cardiac or respiratory failure occurs. Several other terms have been employed
to describe the situation which physicians refer to as a "no code." "Passive euthanasia" and
"negative euthanasia" are two of the common terms used by ethicists to describe the idea
that it is acceptable in some circumstances to allow a patient to die by withholding treat-
ment. Inherent in these terms is the notion that the physician does not do anything to bring
about the patient's death. See generally M. KOHL, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
723 (1975) and Brown, Bulger, Laws, & Thompson, The Preservation of Lfe, 211 J. A.M.A.
76 (1970).
3. In re Spring, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 409 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein,
1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 736, 380 N.E. 2d 134 (1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
4. For a closer look at the medical community's point of view, see Relman, The
Saikewicz Deciion.'A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1978). Relman states that
judicial involvement in areas traditionally within the private realm of physicians and fami-
lies fundamentally changes the manner in which medicine is to be practiced, thus generating
unnecessary suffering among terminally ill patients.
An example of a hospital which has successfully formalized the procedure for issuing
ONTR is Children's Hospital National Medical Center, in Washington, D.C. At any time,
the attending physician may initiate the ONTR process by meeting with the family to dis-
cuss what will be done in case of cardiopulmonary arrest. After several meetings, a verbal
agreement is reached as to the type of medical care to be administered, and this agreement is
documented by the attending physician on the patient's progress notes. The agreement is
also incorporated into the physician's orders which inform other physicians and the nursing
staff of the degree of care required. See Resolution by the Children's Hospital National
Medical Center Board of Directors concerning "No-Code 99" (Sept.24,1975) (available in
the administration offices of Children's Hospital National Medical Center, Washington,
D.C.). See also Le Blang, Does Your Hospital Have A Policyfor No-Code Orders?, 9 LEGAL
Asp. OF MED. PRAc. Mar.-Apr. 1981, at I, 5.
5. The National Conference for Standards on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation has
stated: "Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is not indicated in certain situations, such as in cases
of terminal irreversible illness, where death is not expected, or where prolonged cardiac
arrest dictates the futility of resuscitaton efforts. Resuscitation in these circumstances may
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sicians use in determining whether an illness is terminal6 and whether the
efficient allocation of scarce medical resources and the quality of life are
factors that should be considered in the decision-making process.7
Who should play the major role in the decision to issue ONTR is a point
represent a positive violation of an individual's right to die with dignity." Standards/or CPR
and ECC, supra note 2, at 864.
In 1957 Pope Pius XII, in an address entitled "The Prolongation of Life" before the Inter-
national Congress of Anesthesiologists, said that if death is inevitable there is no obligation
to use extraordinary means to save a patient's life. Concerning the rights and duties of physi-
cians, the Pope stated:
[T]he doctor, in fact, has no separate or independent right where the patient is
concerned. In general he can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly,
directly or indirectly, gives him permission. . . [Tihe patient, if he were capable of
making a personal decision, could lawfully use [resuscitation] and, consequently,
give the doctor permission to use it.
The Prolongation of Life, 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 397 (1957). The Pope continued, stating
that "the interruption of attempts at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of the
cessation of life." Id
6. See Rabkin, supra note 1, at 365 which defines some of these terms as follows:
The disease is 'irreversible' in the sense that no known therapeutic measures can be
effective in reversing the course of illness; the physiologic status of the patient is
'irreparable' in the sense that the course of illness has progressed beyond the capac-
ity of existing knowledge and technic to stem the process; and when death is 'immi-
nent' in the sense that in the ordinary course of events, death probably will occur
within a period not exceeding two weeks.
7. How to best distribute limited medical resources is not just an academic debate; it
poses a real and constant dilemma for physicians. An example of a limited medical resource
is the number of beds in a hospital's intensive care unit. The number of hospital beds is
limited, and if several of the beds are occupied for long periods of time by terminally ill
patients, persons whose lives could otherwise be saved will die. Kidney dialysis machines are
another example of a limited medical resource that is in great demand. One author suggests
that a lay hospital committee be formed that could relieve the physician of the burden of
allocating limited medical resources. This committee would reach a decision after consider-
ing factors such as age, sex, marital status, dependents, income, net worth, emotional stabil-
ity, past contributions to society, and future potential. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT As PERSON
239-46 (1970).
In Medical Care and the Social Worth of Man, 36 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 96-99
(1966), Shatin endorses a pragmatic approach to the distribution of medical care. He states
that to argue against assigning a relative value to an individual who is one of many persons
competing for limited medical care merely avoids the problem since physicians must, and in
fact do, continually choose who shall receive limited resources. He suggests that the follow-
ing factors be considered in order to create "an index of the social value of a person": the
economic productivity of the individual when well, his age and the number of productive
years left, his marital and family status and responsibilities, whether any responsibility for
the welfare of others exists, the medical prognosis, community relationships, previous and
future social and cultural contributions, and whether or not a history of anti-social behavior
exists. Id at 98-99.
For a radically different approach to this problem, see Childress, Who Shall Live When
Not All Can Live?, SOUNDINGS, Winter 1970, at 53. The author suggests that a system of
random selection be utilized in the allocation of scarce resources.
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of contention between the medical and legal professions. The medical pro-
fession argues that, historically, patients have relied on the professional
judgment of physicians. It asserts that physicians are well trained to deal
with life-death decisions, whereas the courts are ill-equipped to enter this
particular realm of medicine. Furthermore, present hospital procedures
can effectively safeguard a patient's rights. The legal profession, on the
other hand, labels the physicians' approach to ONTR "medical paternal-
ism"8 and insists that judicial intervention is necessary due to the awesome
powers that technological advances have conferred upon physicians.9
Cases concerning the withholding of medical treatment are scarce. In
fact, there is to date only one case that deals specifically with the issuance
of ONTR, In re Dinnerstein, ° a Massachusetts appellate court case. There-
fore, this Comment will consider cases that are important, not for the legal
guidelines they establish, but because they are indicative of the direction
that the courts are going in this area. An analysis of these cases demon-
strates that the courts are beginning to voluntarily diminish their participa-
tion in the controversy over withholding medical treatment. The following
discussion of several withholding treatment cases will reveal that the
courts, having previously dealt with issues beyond their expertise, are now
demanding that state legislatures assume more responsibility in this sensi-
tive area."
For a discussion of the issue as to whether "the quality of life" is a factor that should enter
into the decision-making process, see McCormick, A Proposalfor "Quality of Life" Criteria
for Sustaining Lfe, 56 Hosp. PROGRESS, Sept. 1979, at 76.
8. See Baron, Assuring "Detached But Passionate Investigation and Decision The Role
ofGuardians AdLitem in Saikewicz-type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 11 (1978). Baron asserts
that decisions involving the withholding of medical treatment must be made in an adversary
setting in order to safeguard the patient's rights. See also Baron, Medical Paternalism and the
Rule of Law. A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (1979).
9. See Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism.: Not the Only 41ternatives
for Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Medi-
calPaternalism]. Buchanan asserts that it is proper to assume that the family of an incompe-
tent, terminally ill patient has a defeasible right to decide the course of his treatment, and
that the family should receive help from an ethics committee in order to develop a frame-
work within which to make its decision. The ethics committee should consist of medical,
administrative and lay persons. If the ethics committee thought that the patient's best inter-
ests were not being served by the family's decision, it would seek legal intervention.
For a discussion of the necessity of court participation in decisions concerning prolonged
death, see Problem oProlonged Death, supra note 1.
10. 1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 736, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
i1. So far, 11 states have responded to the need for right-to-die legislation. In 1981, 37
right-to-die bills were introduced in 21 state legislatures. These so-called "living will" laws
are an attempt to guarantee that the individual's right to decline treatment will be exercised
when he becomes incompetent. A typical "living will" includes a definition of terms, execu-
tion and revocation provisions, and an immunity provision to protect medical personnel
from penalties. Yale University law students, in conjunction with the Society for the Right
[Vol. 31:515
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I. BACKGROUND ISSUES AND EARLY CASE LAW
Before examining the pertinent case law, it is necessary to make several
initial observations. Though existing case law provides general guidelines
for the withholding of medical treatment and the administration of
ONTR, the grey areas of ONTR have yet to be examined. Problems asso-
ciated with ONTR create such a logistical and ethical tangle that the courts
would be well-advised to keep their distance. For example, what is the
physician's role when ONTR were intended, but not issued, due to an ad-
ministrative error? If the patient goes into cardiac arrest after the decision
to withhold treatment has been made, but before ONTR have been com-
municated to the rest of the staff, what should the physician do? He may
feel compelled to either needlessly prolong the suffering of a terminally ill
patient by administering emergency care, or to risk being accused of medi-
cal negligence for withholding treatment without having triggered the nec-
essary support system.
12
to Die, have drafted a model bill which provides a good illustration of what proposed legis-
lation should include. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 17
(1978); see also Bok, Personal Directionsfor Care at the End of Life, 295 NEW ENG. J. OF
MED. 367 (1976); Paris & McCormick, Living- Will Legislation, Reconsidered, 145 AMERICA,
Sept. 1980, at 86; Phillips, Living Wills-Moral Directive Can Cause Legal Dilemma, HosP.
MED. STAFF, May 1978, at 20; Steele & Hill, A Legislative Proposalfor a Legal Right to Die,
12 CRIM. L. BULL. 140 (1976); Note, The "Living Will" The Right to Death with Dignity?, 26
CASE W. RES. 485 (1976); Note, The "Living Will"--An Individual's Exercise of His Rights of
Privacy and Self-Determination, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 714 (1976); Note, Living Wills-Needfor
Legal Recognition, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 370 (1976).
12. For a discussion concerning a physician's liability in this area, see Collester, Death,
Dying and the Law. A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 311-
14 (1977); Collins, Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging Life, 206 J. A.M.A. 389
(1968); Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liabilityfor the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 54 (1975); Sharp & Crofts, Death With Dignity -The Physician's Civil Liability,
27 BAYLOR L. REV. 86, 98-99 (1975).
To date, no physician has been found either civilly or criminally liable for causing a pa-
tient's death by withholding treatment. One reason is that it is extremely difficult to prove
that a terminally ill patient actually would have lived had resuscitative measures been at-
tempted. Another problem is whether a distinction should be made between causing some-
one to die by commission of a positive act and allowing someone to die through inaction,
i.e., withholding treatment. Whether one physician would be held criminally liable for
"pulling the plug" when another would not be liable for failing to start the initial treatment
is unclear. Certainly, however, to maintain that there is a difference in the degree of culpa-
bility may have the undesirable effect of promoting nontreatment over treatment. See
Memel & Lemkin, The Legal Status of 'Wo Code Orders", 7 Hosp. MED. STAFF, May 1978,
at 2.
The absence of a formalized hospital procedure for the issuance of ONTR becomes a
tragic omission when a patient's best interests are served by not prolonging his death. In
such a situation, the unfortunate result is the so-called "slow code" in which emergency care
is administered, but less than wholeheartedly so that the patient will die. The "slow code" is
universally disavowed by hospitals but occurs nonetheless as a consequence of not having an
19821
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Furthermore, what degree of compliance by the doctor is necessary to
carry out the ONTR according to the wishes of the parents or other close
relatives? ONTR quite often represent a compromise by which the parents,
aware that death is inevitable, allow the omission of certain procedures
(i.e., the injection of inotropic drugs) but, perhaps in order to justify their
decision, insist on the commission of others (i.e., "bagging"-a form of
manual artificial respiration). How many times a patient should be bagged
or for how long are questions of degree left to the physician who carries
out the orders. Whether the physician's response to the situation is actually
reflective of the wishes of the family may be impossible to ascertain.
In addition, to what extent is a family coerced by the medical staff in
formulating their decision to withhold therapy? An obvious problem is
that the nature of ONTR necessitates that the decision to withhold treat-
ment be a private one. It is unknown, therefore, how well versed the family
is in the options available to it. Can a troubled family assimilate the infor-
mation necessary to make such a difficult decision? 3
Finally, how does a court guarantee that a family's wishes will be com-
plied with? The delicacy and intricacy involved in carrying out a court's
orders in this field make it almost impossible to know whether or not there
has been substantial compliance. If the doctor did not in fact comply with
the family's wishes, can it be proven that the patient's death resulted from
the doctor's omission?
These are but a few of the uncharted areas surrounding ONTR. The
following examination of the relevant case law will establish what issues
are settled in this emerging field.
A. Quinlan.: The Seminal Case
The first case to draw national attention to the plight of a family wishing
to terminate medical care for one of its own was In re Quinlan. " Quinlan
involved a comatose twenty-one-year-old girl, Karen, who was placed on a
respirator upon being admitted to a hospital. Her family sought to have
the respirator withdrawn when it became apparent that she was in a "vege-
tative" state, having no awareness of her surroundings and existing at only
a primitive reflex level. I5 When the attending physicians refused to discon-
tinue the respirator, the family filed a complaint asking that she be de-
open and efficient procedure by which to implement ONTR. See Petty, Don't Just Do Some-
thing-Stand There!, 139 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 920 (1979).
13. See Duff, Counseling Families and Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children." A
Way of Coping with "Medical Vietnam", 67 PEDIATRICS 315, 316 (1981).
14. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
15. Id at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
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clared incompetent and that her father be appointed general guardian with
specific permission to withdraw the life-support apparatus. The New
Jersey Supreme Court appointed Karen's father guardian with authority to
exercise Karen's right to privacy, which encompassed the right to decline
life-prolonging treatment when there no longer existed the possibility of
her returning to a "cognitive, sapient state." 6
It is important to note that Quinlan involves an incompetent patient's
right to terminate a pre-existing life support system, as distinquished from
the initial withholding of ameliorative therapy. Also, Quinlan is of limited
significance because the holding has been subsequently challenged. 7 Yet,
three aspects of the Quinlan decision retain importance in a discussion of
withholding medical treatment. First, Quinlan represents judicial acknowl-
edgement that continuing medical treatment merely to prolong the life of
an irreversibly ill patient is not mandatory.'" Second, the Quinlan court
predicated its holding on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of the
right to privacy, which it said applies equally to both competent and in-
competent patients and forms a valid basis for the refusal of medical
care.' 9 Third, the court appointed Karen's father as her guardian based
upon the theory of substituted judgment.2"
16. Id at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
17. The Quinlan court called legal intervention in the area of terminating medical treat-
ment "cumbersome" and "a gratuitous encroachment" upon the domain of medical exper-
tise. Id at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. In contrast, a subsequent Massachusetts court stated that life
and death questions should benefit from "the detached but passionate investigation and
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created."
Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 729, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977).
18. 70 N.J. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667. See Standards/or CPR & ECC, supra note 2.
19. 70 N.J. at 47, 355 A.2d at 663. Margaret Randall argues, in The Right to Die a
Natural Death. A Discussion of In re Quinlan and the California Death Act, 46 U. OF CINN. L.
REV. 192, 202-03 (1977), that the state action which must be present in order to invoke the
fourteenth amendment is arguably absent in the Quinlan case. Rather than making the
forced argument that the physicians' actions are part of state action, she suggests that the
courts view a patient's right to privacy "as a common law right to control her own body."
Four years later, the New York Court of Appeals took precisely this position in In re Storar.
52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272 (1981). See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
20. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Under the theory of substituted judgment, a court can
"[d]on the mantle of the incompetent and ... substitute itself as nearly as may be for the
incompetent . . to act upon the same motives and considerations as would have moved
her." Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 57-58 (1976). As Professor Robertson explains, the interests of an
incompetent must be determined "with the characteristics, tastes, preferences, history, and
prospects of the incompetent. . . those he presently has and those he is likely to have in the
future." Id at 65. See also Withholding Medical Treatment, supra note 1, at 66, for a discus-
sion of the distinction between a guardian ad litem, who is a guardian with the limited role
of representing the incompetent in litigation, and a general guardian, who has general cus-
tody of the person and property of the ward. The authors assert that the general guardian is
1982]
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The aspect of the Quinlan decision which is particularly relevant to a
discussion of withholding medical treatment is the rationale which under-
lies the court's decision to allow Karen's respirator to be discontinued.
Though Karen's physical condition did not meet the criteria for brain
death,2' and her illness was not considered terminal,2" the court sanctioned
the withdrawal of the life-support system because there was no possibility
of her returning "to a cognitive, sapient state."23 The court's decision was
not "judicious medical neglect," as one author has called it, 4 but an affir-
mation of the private nature of death and the integral role that the family's
physician historically has played in choosing the manner in which a pa-
tient dies. 5
Although the Quinlan court required that the incompetent patient's
wishes be represented through the use of substituted judgment, it failed to
suggest a process for the determination of the patient's wishes. The court
presumed that Karen would wish the respirator discontinued because her
family and the ethics committee decided there was no "reasonable possi-
bility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a
cognitive, sapient state."26 Thus, it is safe to conclude that the nature of
Karen's illness and her physical condition, rather than her own wishes,
were the decisive factors in the court's order to allow termination of
treatment.27
the proper party to represent an incompetent when the court is relying upon the doctrine of
substituted judgment because a general guardian traditionally has a more intimate relation-
ship with the incompetent and, thus, is better able to ascertain his interests.
21. More than half the states recognize through either statutes or judicial decisions that
a patient is dead when all brain functions irreversibly cease. However, since there is pres-
ently no uniform criteria for determining "brain death," in order to establish guidelines
representative of current medical practice, the following model statute has been proposed by
the A.M.A., the A.B.A., and the President's Commission for the Study of Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research: "An individual who has sustained
either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determina-
tion of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards." Guidelinesfor
the Determination of Death, 246 J. A.M.A. 2184 (1981). See also McCabe, The New Determi-
nation of Death Act, 67 A.B.A. J. 1476 (1981).
22. 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 656.
23. Id at 54, 355 A.2d at 671
24. See Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-legal Implications of In re Quin-
lan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267, 270 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Die].
25. Buchanan, in Medical Paternalism, supra note 9, at 110 states: "It is not just that the
family is likely to be better acquainted than the court with the patient's personal interests
and distinctive preferences; in addition, members of the family have a special responsibility
for each other's welfare . . . the judicialization model inappropriately denies any special
role to the family ....
26. 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
27. The court's purely theoretical application of the doctrine of substituted judgment
[Vol. 31:515
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B. Post-Quinlan. The Tempest Brews
One year after the Quinlan decision was handed down, a Massachusetts
case concerning the withholding of medical treatment caused a similiar
controversy and gained as much notoriety as Quinlan. Superintendent v.
Saikewiczz8 provided the Massachusetts courts with an opportunity to de-
cide to what extent they would become involved in this sensitive area. In a
holding seemingly in total disagreement with Quinlan, Saikewicz estab-
lished a new basis for court involvement by requiring advance court ap-
proval on the issue of whether or not life-prolonging treatment should be
provided.
Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded, sixty-seven year old man
suffering from incurable leukemia. Though the disease would ultimately
result in his death, he experienced no pain or side effects from the leuke-
mia. In fact, when the issue of chemotherapy arose, his general health was
described as good. Though there was a thirty to fifty percent chance that
chemotherapy would cause Saikewicz to go into remission for two to thir-
teen months, serious adverse side effects, such as nausea and bladder irrita-
tion, were also almost certain consequences. 29 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the fourteenth amendment's right to privacy al-
lowed Saikewicz to decline treatment if that was his wish. Further, the
court ruled that an incompetent patient's wishes must be determined by a
probate court in order to guarantee that the incompetent had properly ex-
ercised his right to refuse treatment.3 0 The medical community viewed this
controversial decision, especially the requirement of prior probate court
approval, as an unwarranted judicial intrusion which would necessitate a
major change in the way medicine would be practiced in the future.31
suggests that the court felt that the type of life which Karen led in the coma presented no
choices concerning the respirator. Gold, Book Review, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 93 (1977),
would agree. Gold states that considering the quality of life Karen was leading, she was
already dead, having "lost all the rights appurtenant to being human." Id He argues that "it
is not merely life, but 'human' life, that we deem worthy of protection." Id at 92. A similar
distinction is made in other cases concerning the withholding of medical treatment between
patients who are alive and for whom there is a meaningful choice to be made concerning the
type of treatment they wish, and patients who are in the process of dying for whom the right
to treatment is irrelevant. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
28. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d at 417 (1977).
29. Id at 733, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
30. Id at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424. The Saikewicz court said that not only was the pro-
bate court granted equity jurisdiction by statute, but it had the inherent and specific author-
ity to act in all matters concerning guardianship. Id
31. See Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 499, 500 (1978) and
Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1978). Cur-
ran says that the Saikewicz court's disagreement with the Quinlan court shows "a lack of
understanding and a distrust of the current medical-care system." He concludes that the
19821
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The Saikewicz court reconciled its decision with Quinlan by saying that
both cases shared the same goal of determining "with as much accuracy as
possible the wants and needs of the individual involved. 32 Parental deter-
mination in Quinlan was appropriate because the father knew his daughter
well and could draw on experience to determine what her choice would
have been had she been cognizant.3 3 In Saikewicz, there was no similarly
interested relative, so the court was compelled to intervene and subjec-
tively decide what Saikewicz would have chosen, utilizing the doctrine of
substituted judgment.34 In order to guarantee that the best interests of the
patient were represented, 35 while simultaneously promoting the state inter-
est in the preservation of life,36 judicial oversight was necessary. Perhaps
the cornerstone of the Saikewicz decision was not the use of the doctrine of
substituted judgment but the application of the "benefit versus risk" rule.
The thirty-to-fifty percent chance of a two to thirteen month remission
procedure suggested by the Saikewicz court for handling life-death decisions is so slow and
cumbersome that it will merely result in the prolongation of treatment. Id Relman, in the
article entitled The Saikewicz Decision.: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 508
(1978), says that "the general intent of the Court is unmistakable. This astonishing opinion
can only be viewed as a resounding vote of 'no confidence' in the ability of physicians and
families to act in the best interests of the incapable patient suffering from a terminal illness."
Id
32. 373 Mass. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
33. As discussed previously, it is not at all clear whether Karen's choice of treatment
was merely assumed as a result of her physical condition, or was actually determined
through the use of substituted judgment. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. 373 Mass. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431. Precisely how implied consent is to be ob-
tained from minors, mentally ill and retarded persons, and the comatose is not clear. In the
past, family members were considered to have the patient's best interests at heart. More
recently, the courts have appointed guardians to represent the patient's wishes, especially
when there were no close relatives, as was the case in Saikewicz. The Saikewicz court devel-
oped the most stringent requirement for determining the wishes of incompetents. It stated
that judges were the proper source of substituted judgment. Id at 755-59, 370 N.E.2d at 432-
35. For a criticism of this holding, see Gutheil & Applebaum, Substituted Judgment and the
Physician's Ethical Dilemma." With Specqfc Reference to the Problem of the Psychiatric Pa-
tient, 41 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 303, 305 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Substituted Judgment].
Whether the doctrine of substituted judgment is even applicable to a profoundly retarded
man is a point of controversy. See Annas, Quality of Life in the Courts.- Earle Spring in
Fantasyland, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1980, at 9. Annas says the substituted judg-
ment test can never apply to severely retarded persons, because in attempting to guess their
wishes by using this subjective standard, courts create "make-believe" reasons. See also
Ramsey, The Saikewicz Precedent. What's Good for an Incompetent Patient, 8 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Dec. 1978, at 36. Ramsey says since Saikewicz could not and had never been
able to communicate, there was nothing to guide the court in determining his wishes. The
court merely "made up their subjective minds, without foundation in any adequate discov-
ery or finding or test, what would be good for Joseph Saikewicz." Ramsey, 8 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. at 40.
35. 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
36. Id at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
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simply did not justify the use of chemotherapy with its painful side-
effects.37
It is not surprising that the medical community viewed the Saikewicz
decision with dismay. Many commentators felt that Saikewicz's prognosis
was more within the realm of medical certainty than Quinlan's had been;
yet, the court, from the physician's viewpoint, denied them the responsibil-
ity of deciding Saikewicz's care whereas physicians had been given great
leeway in the Quinlan case.38 While the consequences of turning off Karen
Quinlan's respirator were a matter of conjecture, and therefore judicial in-
tervention was arguably necessary to protect Quinlan's interests,
Saikewicz's prognosis was a matter of fact. Anemia, chronic infections, se-
vere nausea, numbness and loss of hair are some of the side-effects associ-
ated with chemotherapy that Saikewicz would have experienced.39
The medical profession's reaction to Saikewicz was thus one of anger
and disbelief.' It appeared that the courts were asserting that they were
more qualified than physicians to assume the responsibility for determin-
ing what treatment was in a patient's best interests. Within a year, how-
ever, the courts were presented with the opportunity to answer the
physicians' complaints in the case of In re Dinnerstein.4
Dinnerstein was the first case to specifically address the issuance of
ONTR. The medical community hoped that Dinnerstein would serve as a
clarification and perhaps a modification of Saikewicz.
37. See The Right to Die, supra note 24, at 297.
38. Dr. Relman, Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, is representative of
the medical community's point of view concerning Saikewicz: "[Tlhe Court seems to be
saying that even under emergency situations, where medical decisions could not possibly
have prior judicial sanction, physicians must not be allowed to use their own professional
judgment, but should be guided instead by governmental regulations." Relman, The
Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 508 (1978); see gener-
ally Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, supra note 31 and Trout, The Courts and the Practice of
Medicine, 4 J. OF LEGAL MED. Oct. 1976, at 2.
39. 373 Mass. at 733, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
40. See Allan, No- Code Orders vs. Resuscitation.- The Decision to Withhold Lie-Prolong-
ing Treatment from the Terminally 111, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 139, 157-58 (1979). Discussing
Saikewicz, Allan states:
[Alt the very time when a few major health care institutions were beginning to
establish and publish guidelines for the withholding of medical treatment in an
attempt to provide some kind of certainty of procedure and uniform patient protec-
tion ... the status of the commonly practiced No-Code procedure was thrown
into doubt.
Id
41. 1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 736, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
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II. CURRENT CASE LAW CONCERNING THE WITHHOLDING OF
MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. Dinnerstein Calms the Medical Profession
At first glance, the Dinnerstein decision appears antithetical to
Saikewicz, providing the medical profession with the very freedom from
judicial restraint that they claimed was their perogative. The two cases can
be reconciled, however, by examining the factual differences between
them.
Sixty-seven year old Shirley Dinnerstein suffered from a degenerative
brain illness called Alzheimer's disease.4" There is no known cure for this
progressive disease which eventually destroys the brain tissue, leading to
the loss of all intellectual and motor functions and inevitable death. By the
time the case and its issue of whether or not a physician could lawfully
issue ONTR without advance approval by a probate court reached the Ap-
peals Court of Massachusetts, Dinnerstein was in a vegetative state, para-
lyzed on her left side, and fed through a naso-gastric tube.43 Her attending
physician recommended that when cardiac or respiratory failure occurred,
she not be resuscitated. The Dinnerstein court agreed and held that an at-
tending physician may lawfully direct that resuscitative measures be with-
held from an incompetent and terminally ill patient without prior approval
from a probate court." The court said that, in this case, the decision to
lessen the suffering of a terminally ill patient was within the competency of
the medical profession.45
Several factors are important in explaining how the Dinnerstein court
arrived at a decision seemingly at odds with Saikewicz. First, the medical
care of Dinnerstein was custodial rather than treatment-oriented. There
was no chance, as in Saikewicz, of "a remission of symptoms enabling a
42. Id
43. Id at 737-38, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
44. Id at 747-48, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
45. This case . . .presents a question peculiarly within the competence of the
medical profession of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent passing
of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the patient's history and condi-
tion and the wishes of her family. That question is not one for judicial decision, but
one for the attending physician, in keeping with the highest traditions of his profes-
sion. ...
Id at 746-47, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
It should be noted that whereas both Saikewicz and Dinnerstein are Massachusetts cases,
Dinnerstein was decided by the lower appeals court. Because Dinnerstein was not appealed,
the highest state court never had the opportunity to affirm or reject it, though they did con-
sider a similar issue in In re Spring. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text for a
discussion of In re Spring.
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return towards a normal, functioning, integrated existence."46 Second,
Dinnerstein's family concurred with the medical decision.47 Third, the
proposed resuscitative efforts were intrusive, violent, and painful.4"
However, these factors, though important, do not by themselves explain
the Dinnerstein opinion. The real difference between Saikewicz and Din-
nerstein is that the supreme court of Massachusetts viewed Saikewicz as
alive, therefore having a choice to make, whereas the appeals court felt
that Dinnerstein was irretrievably in the process of dying.49 Because
Saikewicz had a chance, though slight, of prolonging his life, there was a
choice concerning the form of treatment.5" Dinnerstein's prognosis, on the
other hand, was hopeless. The disease was progressive, unremitting, and
no medical breakthrough was anticipated.51
In addition, the doctrine of substituted judgment, through which the
right to treatment was guaranteed to Saikewicz, did not need to be applied
in Dinnerstein. Unlike Saikewicz, Dinnerstein was not a "right to treat-
ment" case because there was no treatment available that could improve
Dinnerstein's condition. The different holdings in these two cases, there-
fore, are a result of the courts distinquishing between a patient who will
die sometime in the future and one who is presently in the process of dy-
ing. The highest Massachusetts state court took the opportunity to empha-
46. 1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. at 744, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
47. Id at 739-40, 380 N.E.2d at 136. In this respect, Dinnerstein is similar to Quinlan.
Dinnerstein's son, who was also a physician, and her daughter, with whom she lived before
her admission to the nursing home, were adamant about the type of care their mother re-
ceived. Such close and interested relatives were absent in Saikewicz.
48. Id at 738-39, 380 N.E.2d at 135-36. Though the proposed chemotherapy for
Saikewicz was certainly not as violent and dramatic as a defibrillator, which utilizes electric
shock in order to induce the heart to start working again, certainly the degree of pain and
discomfort both patients would have experienced is similar. See Note, Withholding of Medi-
cal Treatment from a Terminally I, Incompetent Patient-A Departure from Saikewicz, 63
MAss. L. REV. 263 (1978). The author argues that there is no valid distinction between these
cases in that neither Saikewicz nor Dinnerstein could benefit from any life prolonging
treatment:
Just as the Appeals Court was concerned with the increased suffering that would be
inflicted on Mrs. Dinnerstein through resuscitation efforts, the Supreme Judicial
Court noted that if Saikewicz took chemotherapy treatment, he would be subject to
a continuing state of pain the reason for which he would never understand.
Note, 63 MAss. L. REV. at 264 (1978).
49. The Saikewicz court described Saikewicz as in "generally good health . .. physi-
cally strong and well built, nutritionally nourished, and ambulatory." 373 Mass. at 731, 370
N.E.2d at 420. The Dinnerstein court said that "'[p]rolongation of life,' as used in the
Saikewicz case, does not mean a mere suspension of the act of dying, but contemplates, at
the very least, a remission of symptoms enabling a return towards a normal, functioning
integrated existence." 1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. at 744, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
50. 373 Mass. at 753, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
51. 1978 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. at 737, 380 N.E.2d at 134.
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size the validity of this distinction two years later when it decided In re
Spring.
52
B. In the Matter of Earle M Spring
Spring concerned the issue of whether or not to continue hemodialysis
for an incompetent patient. Spring was a seventy-eight year old, senile
man who was suffering from "end stage kidney disease." The kidney dis-
ease was permanent and irreversible, but, like Saikewicz, Spring's general
health was good. The hemodialysis treatment, which mechanically filtered
Spring's blood, "did not cause a remission of the disease or restore him
even temporarily to a normal, cognitive, integrated, functioning existence,
but simply kept him alive." '53
Unpleasant side effects resulted from the hemodialysis treatment. Spring
kicked nurses, resisted being transported to the treatment, and tried to pull
the needles out of his arm. Spring's wife and his son (his son was also his
temporary guardian) sought a judgment decreeing that, together with
Spring's physician, they be allowed to discontinue the dialysis treatment.
The supreme court of Massachusetts held, citing Saikewicz, that the pro-
bate court, not Spring's family and physician, was the proper decision-
making party. Utilizing the doctrine of substituted judgment, the court
concluded that Spring wished the hemodialysis treatment terminated. 4
Spring's condition was similar to Dinnerstein's because his kidney dis-
ease was terminal and the medical care was merely custodial.55 The same
court that decided Saikewicz considered Spring to be a "right to treat-
ment" case because, as with Saikewicz, Spring's physical condition man-
dated a choice of treatment. As had been the case in Saikewicz, the Spring
court felt that though death was inevitable, Spring was quite alive, and,
therefore, whether or not to continue the hemodialysis was a decision con-
cerning treatment that Spring should have the opportunity to make. Af-
firming the holding in Saikewicz, the supreme court of Massachusetts said
that the proper party to make the decision for Spring was the probate court
judge and stated that "[iut was error to delegate the decision to the attend-
ing physician and the ward's wife and son."
5 6
The underpinning of this decision is the court's distinction between a
patient for whom treatment is useless and one for whom further treatment
is a viable alternative. As in Saikewicz, the court relied upon the theory of
52. 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
53. Id at 1212, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
54. Id at 1220, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
55. Id at 1212. 405 N.E.2d at 118.
56. Id at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at 117.
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substituted judgment, maintaining that the incompetent's wishes regarding
treatment must first be determined before the "general right to refuse med-
ical treatment . . .[is balanced] . . . against the State interest in the pres-
ervation of life."57 Yet, a question exists whether a determination of
Spring's wishes was really made. Spring had never stated any treatment
preferences. His wife offered her opinion that he wouldn't want to live but
did not back this feeling up with any evidence. 8 Though the court says
that the quality of life "has no analogue in the present case,"5 9 was the
judge's interpretation of Spring's supposed wishes anything but a decision
based solely on Spring's poor prognosis?
Spring affirms Saikewicz and, therefore, seems to endorse the Saikewicz
court's approach to the problem of withholding medical treatment. Ac-
cording to Saikewicz and Spring, the first step is to decide whether the case
is a "right to treatment" one or not. Is the patient presently and irrevoc-
ably in the process of dying, or will he die sometime in the future? Accord-
ing to Spring, if the patient is not presently dying, no matter how certain
his death is, it is a "right to treatment" case, and the courts, using substi-
tuted judgment, must decide what the patient's wishes are.
The Spring court also affirmed Dinnerstein: "[W]e think the result
reached on the facts shown in that case (Dinnerstein) was consistent with
our holding in the Saikewicz case." 6 The court listed criteria that the med-
ical profession should consider when deciding if prior probate court ap-
proval must be obtained. The factors that the court considered to be
important included the degree of impairment, the complexity and risk in-
volved in the proposed medical treatment, the patient's level of under-
standing, how quickly the treatment decision must be made, the family's
wishes, and whether the treatment or the withholding of treatment is good
medical practice.6
Though Spring provides the medical profession with a blueprint for
handling future problems concerning the withholding of treatment,
whether the case actually provides the medical profession with any real
answers is doubtful. The court relies so heavily upon the particular facts in
Spring that its opinion has no predictive value for the medical profession.
57. Id at 1214, 405 N.E.2d at 119.
58. Id at 1220, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
59. Id. at 1220, 405 N.E.2d at 123.
60. Id at 1215, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
61. Id. at 1216-17, 405 N.E.2d at 121. Using these criteria, the court viewed Spring's
prognosis as similar to Saikewicz's in that neither man was in the process of dying and that
hemodialysis and chemotherapy, respectively, might control and defer the course of their
illness.
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Physicians are left in the position of second-guessing whether a court will
view a patient's condition as treatable or not.
Fortunately for physicians, the Spring court stated that the medical com-
munity's second-guessing must either be "grieviously unreasonable" or in
bad faith62 before physicians would be judged culpable. The court also
stressed that "neither the Saikewicz case nor the present case [Spring]
presented any issue as to the legal consequences of action taken without
court approval.
6 3
Although the Massachusetts courts devised the first uniform approach to
withholding treatment cases, the persuasive value of Saikewicz and Spring
remains a question. The first court of another jurisdiction to strongly en-
dorse these Massachusetts decisions was the New York appellate court in
the case of Eichner v. Dillon.' However, the same state signaled a dra-
matic change in direction when its highest court rejected the appellate
court's decision one year later in In re Storar.65
C In re Storar. Prophetic or Archaic?
In early 1981, the highest New York state court, the Court of Appeals
for New York, vacated the seventy-three page unanimous decision which
the appellate court had handed down one year earlier.66 The voluminous
appellate court opinion had generated much controversy due to the vast
procedural demands it required of the medical profession before they
could terminate treatment.67 The recent Court of Appeal's decision is
likely to generate a similar amount of controversy due to its brevity and its
failure to provide any guidelines.
In re Storar and its companion case, In re Eichner, are significant be-
cause they are indicative of at least one court's reluctance to become fur-
ther entangled in withholding treatment cases. Though the holdings in
these cases will probably be favorably received by physicians in New
York, they are so contrary to the previously discussed Massachusetts
62. Id at 1219, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
63. Id at 1214, 405 N.E.2d at 119. For a general discussion of possible medical liability
incurred as a consequence of withholding treatment, see supra note 12.
64. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980), rev'dsub nom.
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
65. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
66. Id
67. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980). The appellate court's opinion
required that before life-sustaining measures were withdrawn, a hospital committee had to
confirm the attending physician's prognosis and a "committee of the incompetent," as well
as a guardian ad litem, had to be appointed by the court to represent the patient in an
adversary setting. 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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courts' rulings that their effect outside of New York will only be to add to
the existing judicial disarray and further confuse the medical profession.68
The first of the companion cases to be considered by the court was In re
Eichner, nicknamed the "Brother Fox" case. It involved an eighty-three
year old member of the Society of Mary who suffered a cardiac arrest dur-
ing a routine hernia operation and was without oxygen for several min-
utes. Brother Fox was placed on a respirator in a comatose state. He had
suffered substantial brain damage and had no reasonable chance of recov-
ery. Fox's close friend, Father Philip Eichner, requested that the respirator
be removed. The hospital refused, and Eichner initiated judicial proceed-
ings to be appointed "committee of the person and property of" Fox with
specific authority to discontinue the respirator.69
In the exhaustive opinion of Eichner v. Dillon, the appellate court had
found that, in addition to a common law right to decline treatment, Fox
was protected by the fourteenth amendment's right to privacy which en-
compassed the right to decline treatment. The court held that this right
could be exercised through the use of substituted judgment.7 °
On appeal, the highest New York state court, the Court of Appeals, re-
jected much of the appellate court's holding. In a short opinion, the Court
of Appeals refused to consider whether Fox's right to decline treatment
was part of the fourteenth amendment's right to privacy because the relief
sought was "adequately supported by common-law principles."71 It also
did not consider the issue of substituted judgment, stating that it was un-
necessary to decide whether "a decision to discontinue life sustaining med-
ical treatment [could] be made by some one other than the patient . . .
[because] . . . Brother Fox made the decision for himself before he be-
came incompetent."72 The court said that there must be "clear and con-
vincing evidence"73 of the patient's intent and that, in this case, there was
compelling proof that Brother Fox would have wanted the respirator dis-
continued.74 Although this is the extent of the court's holding, In re
Eichner is clarified in its companion case, In re Storar.
68. For the medical community's reaction to Storar and Eichner, see Curran, Court In-
volvement in Right-to-Die Cases." Judicial Inquiry in New York, 305 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 75
(1981); Paris, The New York Court of Appeals Rules on the Rights of Incompetent Dying Pa-
tients: The Conclusion of the Brother Fox Case, 304 NEW ENO. J. OF MED. 1424 (1981).
69. 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
70. 426 N.Y.S.2d at 537-41. The appellate court modeled its opinion after Saikewicz
and Spring, citing these Massachusetts cases often.
71. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272.
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John Storar was a fifty-two year old, profoundly retarded man with ter-
minal bladder cancer. Lesions in his bladder caused him to continuously
lose blood. Storar's mother, as guardian, wanted to discontinue the blood
transfusions that Storar was receiving. Though Storar did not like the
transfusions and resisted them, he had more energy after the transfusions
and could resume his usual lifestyle.75
The Court of Appeals said that Storar was an infant mentally, and it was
"unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he would want to continue
potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent."76 Thus, in a
case with facts surprisingly similar to those of Saikewicz, the New York
Court of Appeals rejected the Massachusetts courts' use of substituted
judgment. Rather, the court held that because an infant's parent or guard-
ian "may not deprive a child of lifesaving treatment,"77 the transfusions
should have been continued.
Finally, concerning the need for advance court approval, the court took
a decidedly pro-physician stance, stating:
We emphasize, however, that any such procedure is optional.
Neither the common law nor existing statutes require persons
generally to seek prior court assessment of conduct which may
subject them to civil and criminal liability. If it is desirable to
enlarge the role of the courts in cases involving discontinuance of
life sustaining treatment for incompetents by establishing . . . a
mandatory procedure of successive approvals by physicians, hos-
pital personnel, relatives and the courts, the change should come
from the Legislature.78
The Storar court's refusal to invoke the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment, at first glance, appears to be a welcome relief from its contrived
application in Saikewicz.79 But, is the holding actually anything more than
a "knee-jerk" reaction to Saikewicz? The Storar court establishes an un-
realistically high standard when it insists that only "clear and convinc-
ing,,80 evidence of a patient's own wishes prior to his illness justify the
decision to terminate treatment. The practical result is that all incompetent
patients without "living wills" or an equivalent explicit statement of intent
and all minors forfeit the right to decline treatment.
The impact of Storar outside of New York is yet to be known. It is, as of
75. Id at 374-75, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271-72.
76. Id at 380, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
77. Id at 380, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
78. Id at 382-83, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
79. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
80. 52 N.Y.2d at 379, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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now, the only recent case to reject the use of substituted judgment. It does
join two other state supreme courts, as well as Massachusetts, in calling for
increased legislative involvement.81 Although Storar's scope is narrow, it is
apt to be criticized for rejecting the doctrine of substituted judgment with-
out providing any analytical tools to take its place. It is a significant case
because it indicates that the courts have now acknowledged the complexity
of problems associated with the right to decline treatment and are ready to
extricate themselves from this area at the earliest opportunity. 2
81. Two other "right to refuse treatment" cases have recently been decided by the state
supreme courts of Florida and Delaware. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980),
concerned a 73 year old man with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) who
wished to have his respirator discontinued. The court, in an opinion which cited Saikewicz
often, held that a competent terminally ill patient had a constitutional right to refuse or
discontinue extraordinary medical treatment. Id at 360. The Perlmutter court found that the
same four state interests discussed by the Saikewicz court (the interest in the preservation of
life, the duty to prevent suicide, the need to protect innocent third parties, and the need to
maintain the ethical integrity of the medical profession) were outweighed by Mr. Perlmut-
ter's constitutional right of privacy.
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1980), con-
cerned an incompetent's right to refuse medical treatment. Mrs. Severns was a 55-year old
woman who had been in a vegetative state for almost a year as the result of a car accident.
Her husband wanted all supportive medical treatment withdrawn so that she could die a
natural death. Specifically, he requested that she not be placed on a respirator, that a feeding
tube not be surgically inserted in her trachea, that no antibiotics or other medicines be given
to her (besides those necessary for bodily hygiene), and that a no-code order be entered on
her chart. Citing Saikewicz, Dinnerstein, Spring, and Eichner as support, the Severn court
held: one, the Court of Chancery had the statutory authority to appoint the husband as
guardian of Mrs. Severns' person; two, as guardian, the husband could apply for an order
authorizing removal of life-sustaining support; and three, the Chancery Court would have
power to authorize removal of support if the evidence warranted it. Id at 1334-35.
Both the Perlmutter and the Severns courts urged the state legislatures to promptly ad-
dress the problems of withholding and terminating medical treatment and to enact legisla-
tion to alleviate the many difficulties courts have encountered in this area. The Florida
Supreme Court stated: "[T]he issue. . . is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an
adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type of issue which is more suitably addressed in the
legislative forum." 379 So. 2d at 360.
82. Paris, in The New York Court of Appeals Rules on the Rights of Incompetent Dying
Patients.- The Conclusion of the Brother Fox Case, 304 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1425 (1981)
(quoting Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally ii, 206 J. A.M.A.at 387-88
(1968)), calls Storar "an abrogation by the highest court of New York of the centuries-old
ethical standard that no one--competent or incompetent, articulate or uninformed-need be
subjected to 'extraordinary means of prolonging life . . . when it becomes apparent that
there is no hope for the recovery of the patient.'" In this article, he continues:
If physicians continue to care for terminally ill incompetent patients in conformity
with the highest traditions of the profession and make judgments on the propriety
of actions in consultation with learned, prudent colleagues and the patient's family,
the Eichner-Storar ruling will have little impact on the practice of medicine. If, on
the other hand, physicians opt for legal approbation for their actions, they will
place both the rights of their patients and the exercise of their professional respon-
sibility in jeopardy.
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ONTR
"A dying man needs to die, as a sleepy man needs to sleep, and
there comes a time when it is wrong, as well as useless, to
resist.""
A4. The Present Status of ONTR
From the foregoing cases, several considerations can be gleaned. Putting
In re Storar aside for the moment 4 and reading Dinnerstein in conjunc-
tion with Saikewicz, advance court approval of a medical decision to with-
hold treatment is required only when the choice of starting life-prolonging
treatment is actually a meaningful election for the patient. The decision to
withhold medical care from a patient for whom no existing care can im-
prove his prognosis remains solely within the realm of the medical profes-
sion. However, if judicial intervention in this decision-making process is
initiated by the family or physicians, the courts should not decline to par-
ticipate when the question is finally presented to them. The courts have
specifically enumerated several factors relevant to a decision concerning
whether or not the patient has a right to choose his treatment. These fac-
tors are, in turn, balanced against the state's interest in the preservation of
life in order to arrive at a decision whether judicial representation of the
incompetent should be provided or judicial review of the medical decision
is necessary. The issue of what sanctions would apply when judicial ap-
proval is not sought has yet to be specifically dealt with by the courts, but it
is clear that no fault will lie with the physicians unless their conduct is
"grieviously unreasonable" or taken in "bad faith. ' 85
B. Proposalfor the Implementation of ONTR
The implementation by hospitals of the following proposals will help
abate unnecessary anquish and litigation. First, the hospital should de-
velop a statement reflecting its general policy towards ONTR. This state-
ment should include an overview of the ethical, legal, financial, and
medical aspects of ONTR. Important terms, such as "terminal illness" and
"imminent" should be carefully defined so they can be understood by the
patient and also function as the basis of a uniform approach by the hospi-
Id
83. S. ALSOp, STAY OF EXECUTION; A SORT OF MEMOIR 299 (1973).
84. Storar's immediate effect will be to signal the courts' reluctance to become further
involved in this area to the legal and medical professions and to act as a catalyst for legisla-
tive action. Whether it will be favored over Saikewicz and Spring remains to be seen.
85. 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1219, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980).
[Vol. 31:515
Orders Not To Resuscitate
tal's practicing physicians. The roles that the hospital, physicians, family,
and patient play in the implementation of the ONTR should also be de-
scribed in this statement.8 6 If the patient isa competent adult, the issuance
of ONTR need only be discussed with him. 7 If the patient is incompetent
or a minor, ideally, the family will be the one to recognize that death is
inevitable and will initiate the request for ONTR.
In the absence of such a request, it is the physician's responsibility to
discuss the incompetent patient's prognosis with the family. A suggestion
on his part to issue ONTR (because there is no meaningful treatment
available to improve the patient's condition and resuscitative measures will
merely prolong his suffering) should be the result of sound medical judg-
ment based on the best interests of the patient. The medical decision
should first include a consideration of the purely medical and technical
aspects of the patient's care, which a physician is presumed to possess. It
should further represent a concurrence of the opinions of all the staff phy-
sicians attending the patient. Nonmedical and social factors, such as those
mentioned in the Dinnerstein opinion,"s should be considered secondly by
the physicians in order to further crystalize and legitimatize their decision.
Hospital committee review should be made available upon the request
of either the family or the physician. The committee could consist of social
workers, physicians who are part of the administrative staff of the hospital,
nurses attending the patient, clergy, and members of the hospital's legal
staff. The committee's purpose would be to act either as counselor to the
family, or as arbitrator between the physician and the family, as the situa-
tion would require. Its role would be supportive, and its advice would not
be binding on either party. The committee would attempt merely to pro-
vide objectivity in the decision-making process.
The party whose judgment should be substituted for that of an incompe-
tent patient remains one of the most troublesome questions in withhold-
ing-treatment cases. An incompetent patient has the same right to refuse
medical treatment as a competent patient does. Though far from ideal, the
only way to guarantee that the incompetent patient exercises this right is
through implication. Someone must guess what the incompetent, if he
were competent, would have wished. The people most apt to know the
personal history and wishes of the incompetent are family and friends. If
these people are not available, or are incapable of or unwilling to consent
to a discontinuance of medical treatment, the incompetent's physician
86. See LeBlang, Does Your Hospital Have a Policyfor No-Code OrdersZ supra note 4,
pt. 2, April 1981, at 5-8.
87. Id at 6.
88. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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should take responsibility for that decision. Of course, the more competent
physician would not make the decision to withhold treatment without first
seeking the advice of other members of the hospital staff (e.g., other physi-
cians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, and clergy). Only rarely, would
the situation arise in which a physician would be justified in withholding
treatment based solely upon his judgment and analysis of the patient's
condition and needs.
This proposal is not apt to meet with universal approval, but there are
several reasons why it is preferable for physicians, rather than judges, to
determine the course of an incompetent's medical treatment. First, it is
likely that the physician has had a personal rapport with the patient.
Often, the physician knew the patient when he was competent and, there-
fore, may have a more accurate impression of his personality. Second, the
physician has had the opportunity to deal closely with the incompetent's
family during the course of the illness. The physician's contact with the
family is less formal than a judge's, providing the physician with the op-
portunity to better understand not only the family, but the patient, as mir-
rored by the family's actions. Third, it cannot be assumed that the medical
profession is less able than the legal profession is to make detached, unbi-
ased decisions regarding a patient's treatment. If anything, because death
is an integral part of a physician's work, physicians are better equipped to
deal honestly with this emotional issue.8 9 Fourth, judicial absolution is all
too often sought merely to placate the physicians involved in a particular
case. The patient and family gain nothing from the unnecessary prolong-
ing of their mental anquish.9° Fifth, a physician must treat a patient as his
conscience dictates. A judge's treatment decision, that conflicts with his
own, places the physician in an ethical dilemma. For a physician to follow
a decision that he disagrees with may be "the moral equivalent of aban-
doning the patient."'" Finally, it is wrong for the courts to become in-
volved in medical treatment decisions under the guise of protecting
individual autonomy. An incompetent patient never makes a treatment de-
cision-there is always a third party involved.
89. Decisions about how aggressively to treat a patient are constantly being made by
physicians. See generally Manning, Legal and Policy Issues in the Allocation ofDeath, in THE
DYING PATIENT 253-74 (0. Brinin, Jr. ed. 1970); McCormick, To Save or Let Die-The
Dilemma oModern Medicine, 229 J. A.M.A. 172 (1974); Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthana-
sia of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 883 (1976); Who
Lives and Dies?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1974, at 35, col.2.
90. See Bayley, Terminating Treatment: Asking the Right Questions, Hosp. PROGRESS
Sept. 1980, at 50.
91. See Substituted Judgment, supra note 34, at 305.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The widespread use of ONTR as a tool for relieving the suffering of
terminally ill patients necessitates that hospital physicians not be thwarted
in their attempt to administer good health care by court holdings that are
obscure and unpredictable. Though the implementation of ONTR presents
less of a problem to the practicing physician than does the termination of
already existing medical treatment, the problems associated with the use of
ONTR must be clearly and uniformly addressed so that explicit guidelines
can be established to protect patients and physicians.
Death is an inevitable and inescapable concern for everyone. Families
and physicians have been working together in dealing with the death of
family members for centuries. There has never been a suit against a physi-
cian charging that ONTR should not have been issued. (The issue in Din-
nerstein was whether court approval was necessary prior to the issuance of
ONTR.) The courts should interpret this as representative of the fact that
the medical profession is presently handling the problem of easing the suf-
fering of a dying patient in a manner that is acceptable to the patient's
family. The enactment of formalized ONTR procedures by hospitals will
prevent haphazard treatment of the terminally ill and will bring the emo-
tional issue of death into the open so physicians, hospital staff, and fami-
lies can benefit from each others advice and support.
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